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by Jaap Jan Brouwer.
Hardback (6.5×9.5 inches). 209 pages. 2024.
Subtitle: The Decline and Fall of Tactical Management
This is the follow-up book to The German Way of War: A Lesson in Tactical Management (see the review in the 06/28/2024 AAR or up on hmgs.org) and chronicles the decline of German prowess as WWII wound down. The main cause was simple: not enough of everything, from manpower to supplies to logistical support.
As the German army suffered shortages of these three aspects, corners were cut in training, forces available for attacks and counter-attacks, and freedom of action. The result was a slow, steady decline in prowess. To that you can add that the enemy also became more proficient because their three aspects increased.
For example, ideally, the average German division could defend about 10km of frontage. By 1942, the average division had a 13km frontage, or about 30% more than ideal (p41). As the German divisions shrunk from losses and general attrition, the frontages only became larger.
There’s more to it than that simplification. Despite the growing disparity, man for man the Germans still held an advantage over all the Allies. Appendices explain the calculations that argue 6.07 Soviet soldiers fell for every German soldier in 1944. For the Western Front, that number was 1.53 Allied soldiers fell for every German soldier.
I found discussions about logistics to be interesting as well. The average German division needed 10,000 tons per month, which would take 1,200 Open 2-ton Blitz trucks. For all 130 or so divisions at the start of Barbarossa, that would mean 156,000 trucks. Given attrition, the bare minimum would be about 170,000 (p26). In 1941, the Germans produced 67,000 military vehicles of all types and in 1942 produced 96,000 of all types. In Stalingrad alone, they lost about 100,000 vehicles (p25). The point was that mechanization was only so much at the start of Barbarossa and declined as the years rolled by despite increasing production and scrounging throughout Europe.
A couple typos: The chart of German 1943 tank production lists six types of tanks, but contains only five bars (p30), although I suppose production could be “0” for the Pz 38(t). The chart refers to the Panther as “Panter.” The text usually refers to “Panthers.” This carries over to “Jagdpanter” (p105 and 107) when we know it as Jagdpanther.
The book contains 71 black and white photos and 14 black and white maps.
The book takes a holistic approach to defining the German decline in offensive and defensive projections. Given sufficient support, they could and did perform successful operations, but that advantage eventually faded at the strategic level and then the operational level until the tactical level declined as well.
Enjoyed it.
— Reviewed by Russ Lockwood
