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by Norman Ridley.
Hardback (6.3×9.5 inches). 225 pages. 2025.
Subtitle: Intelligence and Counterintelligence on the Eastern Front
Convention wisdom notes the Germans underestimated USSR manpower reserves in WWII. This book will explain why.
It covers the various kinds of intel and counter-intel, including radio intercepts, agents, Luftwaffe overflights, and other aspects of gathering information. The Soviets were better at it, especially cultivating agents, camouflage, and maskirovka (disinformation). You can also add in British forwarding of ULTRA information, although Stalin was disinclined to believe what the British sent over.
By November 1941, the USSR had 490,000 dead, 1.1 million wounded, 520,000 missing, and 3.8 million POWs in German hands. It’s easy to understand how such numbers would crush Western European countries, but the USSR was made of sterner stuff. When German intel said the USSR was unable to launch any winter attacks, Stalin shipped in armies from Siberia and the Far East once USSR intel discovered the Japanese would not attack.
I found the use of Soviet partisans to gather intel quite interesting. Although not much of a fighting force per se, their initial annoyance became a greater and greater threat to German logistics and German prisoners yielded some gems of intel.
On the flip side, the Soviets had considerable intel about the German build-up in 1940 and 1941, including unit movements, bridging equipment available, and airfield construction. Other sources gave general dates of the invasion, but Stalin refused to believe any of it. Once Barbarossa began, panicked Soviet units broadcast radio messages in the clear, often providing the Germans with accurate tactical info.
Still, the Germans relegated intelligence work as a low priority.
Several typos: “Operation Toch” (p11 is Operation Torch; “Hindenburg’s had called” (p12) should have the “‘s” deleted; “Heilman passed along Luftwaffe reports to Soviet intel…Berlin was highly impressed” (p46) seems like Moscow should be impressed; and “KNVD” (p149 and p161) should be NKVD.
The book contains 16 black and white photos and three black and white maps.
While not exactly a page turner, the workmanlike prose turns out the information and decisions that caused overall German intel failures and overall Soviet successes.
Enjoyed it.
— Reviewed by Russ Lockwood
