by Boris Karpa.
Hardback (6.2×9.2 inches). 153 pages. 2026.
Subtitle: The Roots of Naval Policy in Early U.S. History
This is not a naval battle book, but as the subtitle says, a naval policy book centered around the post-American Revolution era. Thomas Jefferson, and to an extent James Madison, shaped US doctrine at the intersection of national security, economic limitations, and political feasibility.
Jefferson was what the book calls an anti-navalist: he didn’t want a US Navy filled with frigates and ships of the line. Partially, it was the expense of building, manning, and maintaining the ships, but mostly, it was a deep philosophical opposition to what he considered was a step towards tyranny. A navy, he reasoned, would bolster the creation of an Empire and an Empire would lead to stratification of society as in the British Empire — and the colonies had just completed a war to overthrow royalty and aristocracy.
He believed American defense would be better served with port fortifications and small coastal gunboats manned by militia. What he did not count on was British and French depredations of American merchantmen at sea. Between the impressment of sailors into their fleets or simple piracy under the excuse that neutral US ships carried war supplies to the enemy, US trade was being hurt. It was the Barbary pirate attacks that prompted a revision to naval policy and that revision accelerated under Madison in the preliminaries for the War of 1812.
One typo: “launched attacks after attack” (p55) has an extra s.
The book contains 11 black and white illustrations and two black and white photos.
This being a repurposed PhD thesis, the prose lacks smoothness and is often difficult to read. The information and analysis admirably cover a key period between Revolution and War of 1812, but prying such out of the prose often proves tiring. Still, info wins out and ties go to the author.
Enjoyed it.
— Reviewed by Russ Lockwood
